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ABSTRACT
This survey describes the goals and effectiveness of federal regulation of margin requirements on
stocks and options, and the exchange-imposed margin system in futures. After a brief description of
the margin systems, it summarizes the main arguments in favor of margin regulation in general, and
the evidence on the effectiveness of stock margin requirements in achieving these goals. It then
considers the adequacy of the current exchange-imp>osed margins on futures, and the interactions
between margins on different instruments.

THE REGULATION OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS: A SURVEY
by Virginia Grace France
Department of Finance
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
In their reports on the Crash of October, 1987, both the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brady Commission proposed
that the federal government impose higher margins on futures as a way
of controlling excess volatility and preventing a repetition of the
crash. After the drop in the market on October 13, 1989, political
pressure for some sort of regulatory change has only increased.
The first section of this survey describes the federal regulation
of margin requirements on stocks and options. (Futures margins are
not currently subject to direct federal regulation; the exchanges on
which they are traded make rules for futures margins) . The second
section gives a brief description of the operation of the margin
system in stocks, stock options, and futures. The third section
summarizes the main arguments in favor of margin regulation in
general, and the evidence on the effectiveness of stock margin
requirements in achieving these goals.
The fourth section deals with the adequacy of the current
exchange- imposed margins on futures. The final section deals with the
interactions between margins on different instruments.
*
To appear in Lester G. Telser, editor, Margins and Market Integrity:
State of the Art Research on the Impact of Margins on the Stock and
Futures Markets (Chicago: Probus Publishing, 1990).
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1) A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATION:
Excellent summaries of the legislative and regulatory history of
federal margin requirements can be found in Federal Reserve Board of
Governors (1984), Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1981), and Harris
(1958).
The attempts by federal regulators to control speculation in the
stock market originate in the Federal Reserve System's debate over the
relative merits of selective credit controls vs high rediscount rates
in the 1920' s.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System advocated
using various credit rationing devices to try to selectively control
the amount of credit extended to those who seemed likely to use it to
buy stock. Unlike the current system of margin requirements, these
controls operated indirectly, through the Fed's power to rediscount
loans made by member banks , or to refuse to lend reserves to member
banks . The New York Fed advocated the use of high rediscount rates
.
The Board of Governors apparently believed it was possible to restrict
the flow of funds to the stock market without restricting the
availability of credit to "productive" uses by raising short term
interest rates without raising long term rates. Short term rates were
thought to directly influence "call money rates," the rates paid by
brokers to banks. Brokers used call money to finance their customers'
margin purchases of stock (Friedman and Schwarz , 1971, ch. 6).
Attempts to selectively control the use of credit by restrictions
on some sources of its supply are now generally dismissed as
ineffective, given the fungibility of credit: see discussion below
(3)
under "Credit Diversion." Moreover, to the extent they are effective,
credit restrictions of this sort are distortionary : by limiting one
source of financing in an arbitrary fashion, these restrictions may
prevent agents from borrowing in cases where the incremental benefits
of their doing so exceed the incremental costs.
After the 1929 Crash, the 1934 Securities and Exchange Commission
Act gave the Fed power to set margins for certain security
transactions. The Act gave the Fed authority to set initial margins
on all commercial securities traded on a national exchange, and for
all lending done by members of national exchanges. It also gave the
Fed power to set maintenance margins, regulations governing
withdrawals from margins accounts, margins on short sales, and margins
on options on stock. The Act initially exempted margins on unlisted
or government securities from federal regulation (Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, hereafter abbreviated FRBG, 1984).
The Fed's first action was to limit the percentage of equity
value which broker/dealers could lend out to their customers on the
purchase of stocks, or on short sales (Regulation T) . At first, the
margins were set as a fixed function of past price behavior. This
rule proved to be too difficult to administer, and margins were set at
a flat rate. The Fed chose to give the exchanges discretion in
setting maintenance margins.
Initial margin is the percent of stock value which an investor must
deposit to make the initial purchase (or short sale); a more complete
description is given below. If the market moves against the position,
resulting in losses to the investor, he must maintain a certain
percentage of the position value as equity. This percentage is the
maintenance margin.
(4)
Regulations were broadened to cover other sources of credit. In
1936, the Fed published Regulation U to cover similar loans by banks.
In 1968, after the SEC Act was amended to broaden its coverage, the
Fed issued Regulation G, which covers all other domestic lenders of
securities credit, and published regulations governing margins on OTC
stocks. In 1971, Regulation X, designed to control borrowing from
abroad, stated that all borrowers must also obey regulations T, U, and
G.
Starting in 1968, some regulations have been relaxed. In 1968,
broker/dealers were allowed to lend against certain eligible OTC
stocks, and the Fed deregulated loans on most debt. (It set a margin
requirement for convertible debt which is currently the same ratio as
for stock.) In 1985, Regulation T was extended to allow lending
against OTC stocks listed on NASDAQ, and high-yield bonds of certain
types
.
For long periods, margin requirements have remained fixed. They
have been changed only 22 times in all, and have remained at 50% since
1974 (see Table 1 and Figure 1).
In addition to the Fed's initial margin requirements, the New
York Stock Exchange sometimes imposes special initial margins on
individual stocks. These margins are imposed on stocks whose prices
are rising rapidly on heavy trading volume. The first such margin
requirements, which often were set at 100%, were issued in December,
1964 (Largay, 1973). Similar rules exist for stocks listed on Amex
and NASDAQ.
STOCK OPTIONS:
The Fed had been given authority to set margin requirements on
(5)
options in 1934. Until Federal legislation allowed options to be
traded nationally in 1973, the Fed simply endorsed industry practice
for OTC options. In 1977, the Fed issued regulations equivalent to
the common industry standard for exchange -traded options.
2) A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS:
Margin requirements are complex, particularly those covering
options. The following is intended as a guide to enable the reader to
follow the literature, not as an indication of current practice.
STOCKS
:
Initial margin requirements are set in terms of the loan value of
a stock. When a stock is bought on margin, the broker lends the
purchaser some percentage of the current market value of the stock.
The stock is held by the broker as collateral. If the loan value of a
stock were, for instance, 70%, a purchaser could put up 30% of the
stock's value in cash to satisfy the initial margin requirement.
Regulations T, U, and G cover the initial margin deposit. When a
margin purchase or short sale is made, the purchaser must deposit a
minimum of 50% of the purchase price in cash (or fully paid eligible
securities with a loan value equal to the purchase price) in the
margin account within 7 business days. In the case of a short sale,
the amount required is 150%: the entire proceeds of the short sale,
plus an additional 50% margin.
As the stock price changes, the gain (loss) is added to
(6)
(subtracted from) the margin account. In addition, dividend payments
are added to the account (or subtracted for a short position). Also,
the interest charged for the loan amount is deducted.
If the balance in the margin account falls below the Regulation T
margin level, the account becomes restricted, which limits the
investor's ability to make further purchases. If it falls further,
below the maintenance margin level, the broker will issue a margin
call for the amount of the shortfall. This can be met with either
cash, or with an eligible security with a value of 4/3rds of the
amount of the shortfall.
Maintenance margins are set by the exchanges and, for OTC stocks,
by the NASD. These margins are subject to approval by the Fed. The
NYSE maintenance margins are currently set at 25% of market value, or
$2000, whichever is greater. For most stocks, short position
maintenance margins are 30%, but they are a higher percentage of low
priced stocks. (Ritchken, 1987).
There are also federal and exchange regulations governing
withdrawals from margin accounts, additional purchases based on margin
account balances, and the effects of such purchases and sales on the
required balances.
Brokerage houses usually require more margin than the exchange
minimum. Thus, both Federal and exchange margin requirements are not
binding on all individuals. Further, margin may vary between
individuals. The implication for the effectiveness of Federal margin
requirements is discussed in Luckett (1982); see below under "Credit
Diversion.
"
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OPTIONS:
For exchange- traded options on stock or stock indices, Options
Clearing Corporation rules call for buyers of options to pay the full
price of the option (that is, the full premium). This is equivalent
to a 100% initial margin on the option itself, though it is usually
less than 50% of the value of the underlying stock. There is no
maintenance requirement on these long positions.
Those who sell naked options on stock (known as writers of
options) face margin requirements which involve the relation between
the current stock price and the stock price locked in by the option
(the exercise price). Recently, call option writers were required to
deposit and maintain 20% of the stock price, plus the price of the
option, minus the excess of the exercise price over the stock price
(the amount the option was out of the money). A similar rule for puts
requires a deposit of 20% of the value of the underlying stock as
initial margin, plus the premium, minus the excess of the stock price
over the exercise price (the amount that the put is out-of-the-money)
.
The decrease in margin for an out-of-the-money option is limited: the
required margin can only be decreased to a minimum of the premium plus
2
10% of the value of the stock. These rules apply to those writing
puts or calls from margin accounts; these include most written
options
.
Margin account maintenance requirements follow the same formulae
2
These rules are summarized in equation form in the appendix.
(8)
using current rather than initial prices: both put and call writers
must keep the current market value of the option, plus 20% of the
current market value of the stock, minus the out-of - the-money amount;
there is a similar minimum of the current premium plus 10% of the
current market value of the stock.
3
For index options, the rules are similar. The main difference
is that writers must deposit only 15% of the index times the index
multiple rather than 20%. The writer must still deposit the premium,
and may still reduce the deposit by the amount that the option is
out-of -the-money , subject to the same minimum deposit of the premium
plus 10% of the index times the index multiple. As above, maintenance
requirements are the same as initial requirements updated to current
stock prices and premiums.
In general, when a stock price increases by $1, the price of an
option written on that stock will increase by less than $1. However,
the maintenance margin requirement for an in-the-money short option
position will increase by the change in the value of the option itself
plus 20% of the shift iri the stock price. For an out-of- the-money
option, the increase will be even bigger.
Options are also sometimes written out of cash accounts. In the
case of a writer of a call on stock, the stock itself must be
deposited as margin. For the writer of an index call, an options
escrow receipt must be issued by certain banks designated by the
3
These rules apply to broad-based indices only: the S&P 100, the S&P
500, the Major Market, the Value Line, and the NYSE Indices.
Margins on narrow indices are set at 20%, like stock.
(9)
Options Clearing Corporation. The stocks in the index cannot be
deposited directly to cover an index call. The writer of a put on
stock must deposit the amount of the exercise price in cash or cash
equivalents. The writer of an index put must deposit either the sum
of the exercise prices of the index or a put guarantee letter issued
by a designated bank.
Even more complicated rules apply to combinations of options.
The Options Clearing Corporation has recently instituted two systems
designed to measure the potential loss from combinations of positions.
Previous rules recognized the reduced risk from only a few
combinations of positions. For instance, some spread positions were
allowed a lower margin than the sum of the margins on each position
considered separately. This sometimes resulted in discrepancies
between the riskiness of positions and the amount of margin required:
see Phillips and Tosini (1982).
The new systems are designed to be able to deal with more
complicated positions. TIMS (Theoretical Intermarket Margin System)
deals with options as related groups: for instance, a position which
involved long and short options on the same stock with different
exercise prices and expiration dates would be treated as a group.
Using a theoretical option pricing model, it considers a range of
possible prices, and bases the margin on the worst-case scenario in
that range. This system is supplemented by the CONMON (Concentration
Monitoring) System, which is used selectively to monitor the losses on
a member's total position over a wide range of volatility and price
scenarios. A similar system. Dollars At Risk (DAR) is used at the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange for margining positions which involve
(10)
options on stock index futures, including combinations of futures and
futures options.
Excellent descriptions of the operation of margin requirements
can be found in Ritchken (1987), Sofianos (1988), and Teweles and
Bradley (1987). A more complete description of the TIMS and CONMON
systems can be found in CBOE (1990). A more complete description of
the DAR system can be found in CME (1988a, 1988b, 1988c).
FUTURES
:
Margins on futures are required from both the buyer and the
seller of the contract, as a guarantee that each will fulfill his
contractual obligation. If prices rise, those with short positions
are losers and have an incentive to default on the contract; if prices
fall, longs have an incentive to default. Thus, to guarantee
performance, both sides must post a performance bond.
The primary function of futures margin is to guarantee that the
contract is fulfilled. Unlike stock margins, it is not an extension
of credit. Interest is not charged on the difference between the
margins and the total value of the position, because no loan is being
made; indeed, under some circumstances, customers can arrange to get
interest on the margin deposited. Further, when the position is
closed out, the margin deposit is returned, plus (minus) any gains
(losses) made on the position. On the distinction between stock and
futures margins, see Brinkraan (1981), Figlewski (1984), Kahl,
Rutz and Sinquefield (1985), or Telser (1981).
Before an individual enters into a futures contract, he must post
initial margin with his futures commission merchant (FCM) . The
(11)
exchanges set a minimum on the initial margin for each contract (the
decision is typically made by a standing committee of exchange
members)
.
Initial margins on futures are set as dollar amounts per
contract, not as percentages. The amount generally varies between 5
and 18% of the contract value (CBOT, 1989). FCMs may ask for more
than the minimum from some customers, but there is little information
publicly available on the actual margins demanded. Most empirical
studies use the exchange minimum.
Initial margins are lower if a position is classified as a hedge
or a spread. The rationale for this policy is that the risk of
default is lower if there is either an offsetting cash position or
opposite positions in two related futures contracts. Initial and
maintenance margins for hedging and spreading positions are frequently
set equal to speculative maintenance margins.
Maintenance margins on futures, like initial margins, are set as
an absolute amount, not as a percentage of contract value. When the
customer's margin account is marked to market at the end of each day,
if the balance falls below the maintenance level, the futures
commission merchant will call for additional funds, usually for enough
to bring the account back up to the initial margin level. (For
stocks, the customer is usually required to bring the account only up
to maintenance level). If the customer defaults on the trade, the FCM
is liable. Thus, if the funds are not forthcoming, the FCM is legally
empowered to close out enough of the customer's position to bring the
account back up to level. (On the legal responsibility of brokers to
issue timely margin calls and to notify a customer before liquidating
a position, see Van Smith, 1985).
(12)
The settlement time on futures contracts is much shorter than on
stocks. In some cases, a margin call at the close of one day's
trading must be met before trading opens the next morning. Some FCMs
allow their customers more leeway; estimates range up to three days
(Kuhn, 1981). Nevertheless, settlement times are much shorter than
the five to seven day period typical for stock trading.
Futures commission merchants, in turn, deposit clearing margin
with the clearinghouse. (If the FCM is not a clearinghouse member,
the firm will deposit funds with the firm that clears their trades) .
Most clearinghouses collect margin on the basis of an FCM's net
position (exceptions include the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the
New York Mercantile Exchange) . An excellent description of the
operation of the clearinghouse can be found in Edwards (1983) .
As net gains and losses are credited to the FCM's account,
clearinghouses can call for additional margin from clearing firms.
Clearinghouses will sometimes call for additional capital during the
trading day. Also, clearinghouses will occasionally call for "super
margins" from clearing firms which appear to have particularly risky
or under capitalized positions (Brinkman, 1981).
3 ) THE GOALS OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
:
There have been many justifications given for the imposition of
margin requirements on stocks and options. In this section, we
briefly summarize the main ones, and touch on some of the arguments
for and against the use of margins for these particular purposes.
This survey will not attempt to cover the vast amount of
(13)
congressional testimony, which includes several volumes dating from
the 1930 's hearings which lead to the SEC Act. Much of this testimony
is summarized in Seeger (1981)
.
a) CREDIT DIVERSION:
High margin requirements were advocated in the 1930' s as a way to
prevent diversion of capital from "productive" investments into the
stock market. (Nowadays the equivalent argument is that the
relatively low margins in the futures markets draw productive
investment away from the stock market and into futures; see below).
The idea that lending to allow investment on margin in the stock
market decreases overall investment by "using up" available funds is
generally discredited by most analysts. As Figlewski points out, the
buyer of a stock may use credit, but the seller's credit is freed by
the transaction (Figlewski, 1984).
Indeed, a recent theoretical model by Goldberg (1985) shows the
reverse result is possible. An increase in margin requirements
constrains the amount of leverage an individual can assume. In his
general equilibrium model, firms respond by increasing their own
leverage instead, issuing new debt in order to buy back stock. The
firm's increased leverage increases the end-of-period dispersion of
share prices. This increase in volatility may reduce the supply of
funds to risky investments.
MARGIN CREDIT
If margin requirements are effective in preventing credit
(14)
diversion, they should work by decreasing the volume of security
credit. Changes in margin credit is the primary channel through
whichmargin regulation operates on the stock market.
The amount of margin credit has dropped substantially over
time. In the late 1920' s, margin credit was around 11% of the market
value of stocks; it has been below 1.5% of the value of listed stocks
on the NYSE since 1945 (Salinger, 1989). Margin accounts are
comparatively active: they account for 15-30% of trading volume
(Hardouvelis, 1989).
Schwert (1989) points out that the substantial drop in margin
credit occurred in 1929-1934, before Regulation T came into effect.
Since then, margin credit has remained at a relatively low level.
This casts doubt on the economic importance of margins: it is hard to
believe that such a small proportion of the market has a major impact
on its behavior.
In an early book on securities credit, Bogen and Krooss (1960)
studied the changes in margins requirements from 1934 to 1959, case by
case. They found that increasing margins seemed to slow expanding
customer debit balances; small increases seemed to be as effective as
large. Decreasing margins were followed by an increase or by a
slowdown in the decrease of debit balances.
In contrast to Bogen and Krooss 's univariate approach, Cohen
(1966) attempted to allow for the effects of other variables on
securities credit. When such variables as the volume of stock trades,
the amount of new stock issues, the level of stock prices, bank
reserves, bank rates, and GNP are controlled for, Cohen found no
effect of margin requirements on the volume of bank loans.
(15)
Moore (1966) used a similar technique, and reached similar
conclusions, controlling for stock prices, borrowing rates, and
lending rates. He found a statistically (but not economically)
significant effect. '
Using data on investors' equity in margin accounts from 1966 to
1979, Luckett (1982) found initial margins to be effective in changing
4
equity ratios. He found that initial margins were a binding
constraint in 15-20% of the dollar volume of margin accounts; margin
trading during the period accounts for 10-20% of NYSE trading volume.
Thus, the overall effect appears to be small, but statistically
significant.
The Federal Reserve Board of Governor's staff study of margin
regulation concluded that the direction of the credit diversion effect
is uncertain and the magnitude is small (FRBG, 1984).
CREDIT DIVERSION AND FUTURES MARKETS
Credit diversion cannot be used as a justification for the
regulation of futures margins, since futures margins do not involve an
extension of credit. However, the argument is sometimes made that the
existence of futures markets diverts potential investment from the
stock market. Futures contracts have zero net supply: for every
4
Luckett' s data covers only margin accounts subject to Regulation T.
In a survey of sources of regulated margin credit, Ulrey (1975)
reported that 79-86% of margin credit comes from broker/dealers, but
the share represented by bank loans was increasing in the 1970-1975
period. Thus, Luckett' s data covers the bulk of margin borrowing.
(16)
purchaser who buys futures raCher than stocks, there is a seller who
sells futures rather than stocks. Thus, the net effects of a futures
transaction on the demand for stocks should be zero. The effect on
the revenue of the stock exchanges, however, may not be. The effect
of margin levels on the competitive position of the futures exchanges
relative to stock exchanges is covered below under "Interaction
effects.
"
b) DEFAULT PROTECTION FOR INVESTORS OR BROKERS:
Early arguments in favor of margin requirements emphasized
preventing individual investors from over-extending themselves. One
version of this argument involves protection of the unsophisticated
investor. The question is, under what circumstances should the
government substitute its judgment for that of the individual? Answers
to this question vary widely across the political spectrum.
However, intervention need not be justified on purely
paternalistic grounds: if over-extended investors tend to default, and
brokers cannot perfectly distinguish good credit risks from bad,
brokers will raise the interest rates charged to all investors. Thus,
if margin requirements can keep investors from becoming
over-leveraged, they will also protect brokers. (In the case of
futures, the integrity of the market itself may suffer if margins are
not high enough to prevent default. The question of whether the
Indeed, an argument could be made that the existence of futures
increases the demand for stocks, since it allows holders of stocks to
hedge their positions if they so desire.
(17)
minimum margins set by the exchanges are high enough is covered in
detail below.
)
Moore (1966) contended that borrowing restrictions were easy to
circumvent, though he had no information on how often they were
circumvented in practice. Borrowers may misstate the reasons for
their loans, or borrow from alternate sources. Thus, he was skeptical
about the ability of margin requirements to prevent over-extension by
borrowers
.
He attempted to measure empirically the effects of margin
requirements on customer defaults by looking at the riskiness of loans
used to purchase stocks. Measuring this riskiness by the ratio of the
interest rate on 90-day stock exchange time loans to 90-day bankers'
acceptances, he reached the conclusion that margin requirements had no
appreciable influence on the riskiness of loans used to purchase
securities
.
Margin requirements seem at best an ineffective way of limiting
borrowing. Figlewski (1984) argued that while a constraint on one
source of credit may restrain the lender, the borrower can simply
borrow against some other type of asset.
^^
, ^
The argument that high initial margins protects investors from
default doesn't recognize the fungibility of credit, and the
importance of overall portfolio leverage. A constraint on one source
of credit is usually not binding for overall portfolio leverage.
Also, under the current federal regulation, the same margin is
required for volatile as for sluggish stocks (FRBG, 1984), though the
margins actually required by brokers may differ.
On the adequacy of futures margins as protection against default.
(18)
see below.
c) CONTROL OF EXCESS SPECULATION:
High margins are sometimes proposed as a tool for the prevention
of "excess" speculation. The distinction between ordinary investment
and excess speculation is not always clearly explained. Most of the
argument's in favor of decreasing the level of speculation focuses on
its alleged adverse effects. These arguments are described in detail
below, under sections on volatility, price bubbles, and the prevention
of market breaks.
Though there is a long history of political opposition to
speculation per se, most economists would be reluctant to label its
economic impact as undesirable. Arguments that the effects of
speculation on seasonal and geographical fluctuations in commodity
prices are benign rather than harmful reach back to the writings of
John Stuart Mill (1848) and Alfred Marshall (1920). From a
theoretical perspective, recent work by Hart and Kreps (1986) casts
some doubt on its stabilizing role, however.
In the futures markets literature, it is quite common to
distinguish between the hedging (risk management) and the speculative
motives for entering the markets. In fact, there are published
statistics which periodically measure, albeit imperfectly, the
proportion of outstanding futures contracts which are speculative.
These statistics are based on the classification of the positions of
traders who hold large positions at the close of each month; even if
the government definition of "speculative" is accepted at face value,
some extrapolation must be done to classify the positions of smaller
(19)
traders
.
The existence of these statistics gave rise to an extensive
literature on the price effects of speculation in commodity futures,
which is summarized in Tomek (1984). One measure of the amount of
speculation is due to Working (1960). In trying to measure whether
there was sufficient speculation to allow hedgers an adequately liquid
market, he estimated the minimum amount of speculation needed to
offset hedger's purchases or sales of futures as the sum of the
hedgers' long and short positions. This gave rise to the measure
known as Working's T, which increases with the amount of speculation
relative to hedging. Though that was not its original purpose, it is
sometimes cited nowadays as a measure of "excess" speculation.
d) CONTROL OF MARKET VOLATILITY:
As Franklin Edwards(1989) states,
.. Critics .. .believe that "excessive" trading makes markets
worse by distorting prices and increasing the risk to pure
investors (via excess volatility). Their remedy: reduce
trading by eliminating unnecessary and unproductive "noise"
traders, which will in turn reduce or eliminate excess
volatility.
. .This "throw sand in the gears" approach takes
many forms: new transaction taxes, higher margin regulations,
"circuit-breakers," and new market-making regulations to
control undesirable trading. . .Volatility has become a
lightening rod for critics, synonymous with excessive and
destabilizing speculation.
Volatility, of course, means different things to different
authors. An increase in short run volatility may reflect the fact
that the market is responding faster to news, and thus is acting as a
more efficient barometer of economic conditions. It could also mean
that the market is over-reacting. Volatility is also a function of
the level of the market: it is empirically well established that
(20)
volatility increases during bear markets. Increased volatility may
reflect too little participation by speculators, causing a lack of
liquidity. On the other hand, some would tie increased volatility to
too much participation by speculators, causing price bubbles through
excess speculation.
It is sometimes argued that buying stocks on margin, by
increasing leverage, increases the volatility of stock prices.
Briefly, the argument is that a drop in stock prices will lead to
margin calls, which will force some investors to sell out their
positions in order to obtain cash, which will force prices down
further.
PORTFOLIO INSURANCE AND VOLATILITY
The argument is similar to recent critiques of portfolio
insurance. One brand of portfolio insurance involves a dynamic
trading strategy which tries to replicate the payoffs from a put
option. One way of doing this involves holding a changing mixture of
a stock portfolio and the risk-free asset. When stock prices drop,
the mixture should be changed to include less stock and more of the
risk free asset. This type of dynamic hedging strategy is often
implemented by trading in futures markets. Rather than buying or
selling a portfolio of stocks, it is often easier and cheaper to
purchase or sell stock index futures.
If a substantial number of traders are following such a strategy,
an initial drop in prices may trigger stock sales, which may force the
Only certain types of portfolio insurance strategies are alleged to
cause instability.
(21)
price down further. Similarly, an initial price increase would
trigger purchases by these traders. Therefore, the existence of a
large proportion of dynamic hedgers is alleged to cause excess
volatility. Though dynamic hedging is sometimes alleged to have been
a major factor in the Crash of 1987, there is no evidence that markets
where portfolio insurance was a significant factor declined more than
other national markets (Roll, 1989)
If other market participants knew why dynamic hedgers were
trading, the price impact of their trades would be much lower. In a
perfectly liquid market, the price impact of such sales stems from the
fact that other market participants cannot tell whether such sales are
based on bad news about the stocks or merely a consequence of the
dynamic hedging strategy. If a mechanism existed whereby dynamic
hedgers could reveal their strategy, this excess volatility would be
much lower (Grossman, 1988).
In a recent paper, Kim and Markowitz ran simulations of the
interactions of margin requirements with cash or futures market
portfolio insurance. The variety of portfolio insurance which they
modeled, constant proportion portfolio insurance, involved targeting
an acceptable proportionate loss, and keeping some multiple of this
proportion in the risky asset. As losses mount, the amount in the
risky asset must be decreased to keep the proportion constant: this
involves selling as prices drop. Under certain parameter values, they
found that this investment strategy, coupled with a 33% margin
requirement, can lead to an explosive system. Further work should
show whether portfolio insurance is a significant factor under
realistic parameter values (Kim/Markowitz , 1988).
(22)
EMPIRICAL WORK ON MARGINS AND VOLATILITY
The remainder of this section summarizes a number of empirical
studies of the relation between margin requirements and volatility in
the stock market. Empirical evidence pertaining to futures markets is
summarized in a separate section below.
Moore (1966) concluded that the level of margin requirements
imposed by the Fed had no appreciable influence on the extent of
fluctuations in stock prices when interest rates and the level of
stock prices are controlled for. He also looked at the variability of
stock prices before and after the imposition of margin regulation.
Comparing 1919-1933 with 1946-1960, he found that stock prices had
more variance in the latter period, before and after allowing for the
variance in corporate profits. Further, the serial correlation of
stock prices was higher in the later period, which is inconsistent
with a reduction in pyramiding by investors.
Douglas (1969) came to the opposite conclusion. Studying seven
subperiods from 1926 to 1960, he regressed period averages of stock
price volatility on average volatility of dividends and average margin
requirements for 100 stocks. He found that price volatility was
explained by margin requirements even when the volatility of dividends
is controlled for, and suggested that margins reduced price
variability.
Officer (1973) studied margin changes from 1934 to 1970, and
related them to the variability of the NYSE as a whole. He found that
the change in the standard deviation of the previous year's index is
more closely linked to margin requirement changes than the change in the
(23)
standard deviation in following year: the margin requirement change
appears to be a response to the change in volatility, not a causal
factor.
Schwert (1988) relates volatility to real and nominal macroeconomic
volatility, financial leverage, stock trading activity, default risk,
and firm profitability over the period 1857-1986. Like Officer, he found
abnormally high volatility in the period 1929-1940, with lower
volatility before and after. He found that financial leverage had some
effect on volatility, but a small one.
Ferris and Chance (1988) studied the impact of Regulation T
changes on the standard deviation of the return in the S&P500. Using
an event study methodology, they looked at a period of 100 days before
and after each margin change for the 19 margin changes since July
1945. They found ten cases where margins requirements and volatility
both increased or both decreased, five cases where margin requirements
and volatility moved in opposite directions, and four cases where no
significant change in volatility could be detected. Hsieh and Miller
(1990), using a statistical test which is less sensitive to departures
from normality, find only three significant shifts in volatility: one
where margins were decreased and volatility increased, and two where
both margins and volatility declined.
^ . Hardouvelis (1988a, 1988b, 1989) claims that higher initial
margin requirements are associated with reduced actual and "excess"
volatility. Looking at the levels of margin requirements rather than
the changes, he controls for economic factors which might shift
volatility, using proxies for the volatility of dividends and the
volatility of the discount rate. He also looks at the effects of
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margin requirements on Che serial correlation of prices.
Though previous studies had found small or insignificant effects,
he found a relatively large impact of margin requirements on
volatility: a 10 percentage point increase in margin requirements
decreases volatility by 7-8 percent of average sample values.
Further, he contends that increases in margin credit tend to lead
increases in margin requirements, not vice versa. Hardouvelis'
s
article has generated a great deal of controversy.
Hsieh and Miller (1990), reprinted in this volume, are highly
critical of Hardouvelis ' s results, which they contend stem from an
econometric problem known as spurious regression. In brief, since
both margin requirements and volatility tend to persist over time, he
contends that Hardouvelis may be finding a relation between the two
where none exists.
After reexamining his results, they can find no evidence of a
statistically significant relation between changes in margin
requirements and subsequent changes in volatility in the short or the
long run. They do find that the level of margin requirements and the
level of volatility are negatively related, but the effect is weak.
They also find a negative relation between margin requirements and the
amount of stock market credit outstanding. They also find that
changes in margin requirements tend to follow (not lead) changes in
volatility, confirming Schwert's (1989) result below.
Schwert (1989) also claims that Hardouvelis 's results stem from
spurious regression. He finds no evidence that margin requirement
increases are followed by volatility decreases. He does find evidence
that volatility decreases are followed by margin requirement
(25)
increases, but interprets this as evidence that the Fed increases
margin requirements in bull markets, which tend to have low
volatility.
Salinger (1989) notes that one major difference between
Hardouvelis ' s techniques and some other researchers' is that
Hardouvelis investigated the levels rather than changes of the
variables. Looking at the levels of initial margin requirements,
margin debt, and stock market volatility, he found no evidence that
initial margin requirements and stock volatility were linked in the
post-war era. However, when he extends the sample period back to
1934, he finds that both margin requirements and margin debt are
associated with volatility. After conducting further statistical
tests, he concludes that margin buying is probably not the source of
the increase in volatility.
Using a technique which allows a more general specification of
the behavior of stock returns, Kupiec (1989) constructs an alternative
measure of volatility. Using this measure of volatility, he also
finds no significant relation between margin requirements and
volatility. •.
,
. i.
e) PREVENTION OF SPECULATIVE BUBBLES IN STOCK PRICES:
One argument in favor of higher margin requirements claims that
they act as a regulatory tool for the prevention of speculative
bubbles in stock prices. In contrast to transient increased
volatility, speculative bubbles are seen as persistent deviations from
those prices which would be justified by fundamental factors.
Garbade (1982) believes this is the main purpose of margin
(26)
requirements. He describes one model of the interaction between
margins and the formation of bubbles. By allowing increased leverage,
stock margins encourage the ^ractice of pyramiding: plowing capital
gains back into additional purchases of the stock. When leverage
increases, perhaps due to a decline in margin requirements, it
increases the demand for stock, which increases its price, which leads
pyramiding investors to buy yet more stock, which forces the price up
even further. (Similar dynamics involving forced sales follow a drop
in prices)
.
Since investors cannot tell whether purchases are information-based
or simply the result of pyramiding, such a strategy may have significant
long-run price impact. A rational investor must treat a purchase or sale
as a noisy signal which may or may not convey some information about
the underlying asset. A pyramiding purchase will thus increase the
price of the stock until the traders learn that the purchase is simply
the result of a trading strategy, not of good information about the
stock. If this takes a long time, then prices can be pushed out of
line for a long time.
Garbade cautions that it is unlikely that speculative bubbles are
a significant cause of United States stock price fluctuations.
Information is readily available, and the markets appear to use
information efficiently.
Further, he points out that the level of the initial margin
relative to the maintenance margin influences volatility. Where
maintenance margins are relatively high, forced liquidation will be
common. By contrast, relatively high initial margins decrease
volatility by allowing a cushion of loss before a fully extended
(27)
trader is forced to liquidate.
The staff study of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
concluded that the evidence doesn't rule out speculative excesses,
though empirical studies show they probably don't apply to the United
States as a general rule. Isolated incidents, however, can occur, and
even rare bubbles may have very serious consequences. This
possibility might leave a role for margin requirements as a regulatory
tool (FRBG, 1984).
Beyond the theoretical arguments, it is difficult to judge the
presence of bubbles. Our current statistical tests have little power
to detect bubbles reliably, or to measure their severity. They could
be very important or totally unimportant; until we can measure
bubbles, we don't know.
Further, as pointed out in Hartzmark (1986), since we can't
reliably detect bubbles, rules designed to moderate or prevent bubbles
are hard to implement. It is hard to identify a group of traders to
target, and margin requirements are a poor tool for targeting one
group without affecting others.
EFFECTS ON STOCK PRICE LEVELS
One set of relevant empirical results concerns the effects of
margins on stock price levels. If margin requirements effectively
combat a price bubble, a margin requirement increase should be
followed by a decrease in stock prices. (In the case of a bear
bubble, a margin requirement decrease should be followed by an
increase in stock prices)
.
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Bogen and Krooss (1960)
,
in a case-by-case analysis covering
1934-1959, found that increasing margins slowed a rise in stock prices
in most cases, but didn't halt it entirely. Decreasing margin
requirements was followed by the slowing of a downturn or by an upturn
in all but one case.
By contrast, Cohen's multivariate analysis concluded that margin
requirements don't seem to affect stock prices when other variables
are taken into account (Cohen, 1966). He controlled for GNP, bank
reserves, the level of stock prices, new stock issues, interest rates,
and the volume of trading.
Using an event study methodology, Largay and West (1973) found a
"fairly trivial" depressing effect of the announcement of a margin
requirement increase on stock price increases over a number of trading
days; announcements of decreases, however, had no significant impact.
They also detected a run-up in prices before margin increases.
Grube , Joy, and Panton (1979), using similar methodology, found
that for margin requirement decreases, there were strong prior and
announcement effects but no after-effects. They found nothing
clear cut from increases except an increase in volume: the price simply
stopped rising. Both studies noted that margin regulation increases
seemed to come as a response to stock market price rises.
f) PREVENTION OF MARKET BREAKS •
Some advocate the use of margins to prevent sharp market breaks.
Presumably, the authors have in mind the bursting of a price bubble.
If margins can prevent bubbles, then they can also prevent the
subsequent collapse. I have not yet found anything clearly
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articulated which advocates the use of margins to slow down a break
caused by a sharp shift in fundamentals.
The main concern associated with a sharp market break is that it
will trigger a major recession. Cohen (1966) examined the two large
stock market breaks which occurred after imposition of Fed margin
requirements, and stated that, though they were not prevented by the
existence of margin requirements, they were not followed by a GNP
decline. Burghardt and Kohn (1981) point out that it is hard to
quantify the amount of loss from a serious market break.
Sharp market breaks were rare at the time they were writing.
Obviously, if a major break triggers a major recession, the cost is
very high. Barro (1989) found a strong link between stock market
performance and the economy: the rate of return on stocks can explain
55% of the following year's growth rate of GNP over the period 1927 -
1987.
g) DESIRABLE EFFECTS ON MIX OF PARTICIPANTS:
High margins are alleged to improve the mix of market
participants. There are many versions of this argument, some
explained more fully than others. The undesirables differ, depending
on who makes these arguments. Brinkman (1981), for instance, claims
that many who ask for equal margins on stocks and futures are in fact
interested in screening out speculators. Former CFTC Chairman Stone
is said to favor high margins to screen out undercapitalized
investors, presumably because they lack staying power in a panic.
Estrella (1988) points out that the participation of individual
investors is politically important, and that high margins might make
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individual investors more willing to participate in the markets.
Luckett (1982) cites the less risk-averse as undesirable.
Luckett worried that with no margin requirements, the market might be
at times dominated by the least risk averse people, with adverse
consequences for its volatility. He concludes that "since ... social
optimality is largely a matter of judgment, government control of
margins is at least arguably warranted."
Some cite the uninformed traders as less desirable. Here the
motivation is clearer: one externality of both cash and futures
markets is the dissemination of information through the market price.
If market participants have better information, the price is likely to
be a better reflection of underlying value.
Ferris and Chance (1988) argue that higher margins might raise
volatility. They contend that volatility is largely a function of the
heterogeneity of expectations: the more heterogeneous the lower the
volatility. If high margin requirements decreased the number of
investors, the remaining smaller number of investors would be likely
to be less heterogeneous. Hartzmark (1986), in dealing with the use of
margins in futures markets, shows that increasing margins could drive
out either the informed or the uninformed traders. As traders
readjust portfolios, asset demands shift in an indeterminate way.
Commercials, who tend to be well-informed, can shift to using forward
contracts and so may be driven out easily, while speculators remain
A forward contract differs from a futures in that it is a customized
agreement between two private parties. It involves no exchange
guarantees and is not standardized.
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in the market. His empirical measurements indicate that margin
increases do not have any easily predictable effects on the mix of
participants
.
As Figlewski (1984) points out in the context of futures, raising
margin requirements will raise transaction costs. If traders are
taking positions based on disparate price expectations, higher
transactions costs will drive out those traders with less extreme
expectations first. Since the market will then include only those
with relatively extreme price expectations, an increase in margin
requirements will make the market more, not less volatile.
Hardouvelis (1988), by contrast, points out that less risk averse
traders are likely to be more leveraged, and therefore are more likely
to be constrained by margin regulations. This argues that higher
margin requirements would have a disproportionate impact on the least
risk averse traders.
h) EFFECTS ON THE VOLUME OF TRADING:
A separate set of empirical results deals with the effects of
margin regulation on the volume of trading. This relates to the
previous section because a decrease in volume, by decreasing
liquidity, may lead to an increase in volatility (for a formal model,
see Telser. 1981)
.
Bogen and Krooss (1960) find that an increase in margin
requirements is followed by a contraction of volume in 4 out of 6
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cases; a reduction in margin requirements is followed by an increase
in volume in 2 out of 4 cases. Larger increases seem to have bigger
effects on volume. They also found some evidence that with very high
margins, trading in low-priced stocks increases, and they argue that
this represents traders substituting away from high-priced stocks as
their leverage becomes constrained.
Largay (1973) looked at NYSE and AMEX special initial margin
requirements during 1968 and 1969. The prices of these stocks had
risen rapidly on high volume before the margins were imposed. Using
an event study methodology, he found that when high margins were
imposed on individual stocks, the stock prices stopped rising and the
volume in those stocks decreased; when the special margin requirements
were removed, stocks rebounded and volume increased. He considered
the results to be consistent with the theory that banning credit was
associated with the cooling of a speculative fever.
Eckardt and Rogoff (1976) also studied NYSE and AMEX special
margin requirements, using a longer period (January 1967 through June
1969) and a larger sample of stocks. They found no substantial price
effect (a 1-3% fall on day imposed was reversed over the next 25
days). Volume was lower than before, but still above normal levels
for 25 days after.
i) EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE GOALS OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATION:
Cohen (1966) started with a list of purposes given by the Fed as
reasons to change margin requirements: concern over the volume of
security credit, the degree of speculative activity, stock price
behavior, and general economic and credit conditions. He then
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estimated empirically the relationship between initial margin
requirement changes and measures of changes in these factors from 1952
to 1962. He found that stock price behavior was the most closely
associated with changes in margin requirements: increasing stock
prices tended to lead to an increase in margin requirements, and
decreasing stock prices to a decrease in margin requirements. His
results have recently been confirmed by Hardouvelis (1988). Using a
logit regression, he found that in increase in stock returns, as well
as an increase in stock market credit growth, increases the
probability of an increase in margin requirements. Schwert (1989)
found that margin requirements tended to increase following periods of
low volatility, and to decrease following periods of high volatility.
He interprets these results as consistent with those above, because an
increase in stock prices tends to lead to a decrease in volatility.
4) ARE FUTURES MARGINS SET AT THE CORRECT LEVEL? .- , :•; -j
There are several related questions involved in the consideration
of futures margins. The first question is, what is the purpose of
futures margins? If futures margins are designed to act solely as a
performance bond, are they adequate for the protection of the
individual investor? If there are economically important effects which
are external to the exchange, are they adequate for the protection of
society as a whole?
If futures margins are seen as a policy tool to aid the
implementation of any of the regulatory goals discussed above, an
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entirely new set of questions is raised. If futures margins are
proposed as a tool to control leverage, are they an effective
constraint on leverage? If futures margins are seen as a means of
controlling volatility, what can we say about their effectiveness?
a) ARE FUTURES MARGINS ADEQUATE AS PERFORMANCE BONDS?
As explained above, margins are collected at several levels.
First, we shall consider the problem faced by the broker or FCM in
collecting margin from his customers.
THE BROKER'S PROBLEM
Telser (1981), reprinted in this volume, points out that, since a
broker is liable for his customer's trades, he has an incentive to
collect margin even if there is no exchange or government minimum.
The margins collected by brokers in the absence of regulatory or
exchange constraint will be governed by the risk of default, and by
the expected selling price of the collateral if default occurs. The
lower margins which exist for spreads, straddles, and hedges are
consistent with the theory. As the variability of price increases, so
should the margin. Margins will be reduced to the competitive level
by competition for customers among brokers.
In Telser' s model, a broker setting his margin will take into
account the maximum price movement over a few trading periods only,
since futures trades are marked to market daily. The existence of
price change limits, however, complicates the problem faced by the
broker.
The most widely accepted explanation of the role of price change
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limits is given in Telser and Higinbothara (1977). They contend that
price change limits are designed to give member/brokers time to
consult their non-member principals after a major movement in price.
This facilitates the participation of non-members in futures trading.
(An alternative explanation, given by Brennan (1986), is that price
limits are designed to hide the extent of trader losses, so as to
discourage default. In this model, price change limits substitute for
higher margins)
.
Price change limits cause complications in the broker's problem
because if the market goes limit up or down, it is hard to close out a
client's position. This increases the broker's risk. Because of this
possibility, brokers must set their margins to cover changes in the
equilibriiom price, since the futures price itself may be bound by
these limits (Telser, 1981). Estimates of the amount of margin
required for thinly traded commodities range up to two or three times
the daily price change limit (Telser and Higinbothara, 1977)
.
Rutz (1981) contends that, if one contract goes limit up, the
broker can usually offset a client's position by making a trade in
another month, which will limit the broker's losses. Further, even if
all delivery months are at the limit, a position can be offset in the
underlying cash market. Burik (1981) points out that with the advent
of options on futures, price limits are no longer effective in
stopping trade. However, neither type of trade will legally close out
the client's position.
One byproduct of price change limits is that, although they
hamper price discovery, their existence may allow lower margins.
Lower margins mean lower costs to both hedging and speculation
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(Telser. 1981; Kahl , Rutz , and Sinquefield, 1985).
EXCHANGE MINIMUMS
:
Telser (1981) points out that a futures exchange may have an
incentive to impose a minimum margin above the competitive margin
level. The individual broker may ignore the external effects of his
own default, particularly the reputation externalities and the use of
the exchange's safety net. These external effects, however, are
largely internal to the exchange as a whole. The exchange will set a
minimum margin higher than the broker's competitive margins to allow
for these additional costs of default.
In fact, it is not clear whether exchange minimum margins are
binding on brokers. Telser and Higinbotham (1977) is the only study
of which I am aware which was based on data on the actual margins
collected by brokers, as opposed to the exchange -imposed minimuras.
Data of this sort are considered confidential, and therefore are not
widely available. Exchange margins are probably binding with respect
to the most creditworthy of a broker's customers. Of course, if
exchanges minimuras are not binding, they are not directly relevant for
policy, though they may reveal something about the exchange's
perception of the riskiness of a contract.
In an interesting model which incorporates differences in risk
aversion. Hunter (1986) shows that more risk averse brokers will ask
for higher margins. The presence of moral hazard will mean that more
risk-averse customers will prefer to trade with more risk-averse
brokers, so high-margin brokers won't necessarily be driven out of
business. In this framework, for the exchange to set the optimum
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margin, it must use a specific weighting of members' risk aversions.
Rutz (1983) explains how some exchange minimum margins are set.
First, price change limits are set to incorporate approximately 95% of
historical daily price changes in the underlying asset. Hedging and
maintenance margins are usually set at about the price change limit
times the quantity of the contract, that is, at approximately the
maximum daily loss. Initial margin requirements for speculators are
set approximately 30% above maintenance and hedging margins. If
provision is made for the contract to go to variable price change
limits after a certain number of delivery months hit the limit for one
or more successive days, both price change limits and maintenance
margins are raised 50% above normal. For a new contract, minimum
margins may be set lower than otherwise to encourage trading (Rutz,
1986).
Burik (1983) comments that lower margins on new contracts are
unlikely to cause major problems with the integrity of the system,
since their volume is small. He also points out that margin
committees are made up largely of the better capitalized members, who
would not be squeezed out by higher margins but who would bear losses
if undercapitalized members went under. Thus, exchange minimums are
likely to be set relatively conservatively.
THE ADEQUACY OF EXCHANGE MINIMUMS AS PERFORMANCE BONDS:
One difficulty with the study of the adequacy of the futures
margin system is the lack of data on the margins actually required by
brokers. Empirical research must be based on exchange minimum
margins. If brokers are in fact requiring more than the minimum
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margin, these studies underestimate the soundness of the system.
An additional complication is the possibility of interactions
between different parts of a trader's total position. As Kolb (1986)
points out, the fungibility of credit can result in what's known as a
"Texas hedge": for example, using silver as collateral on a long
silver position. It is not known how common this practice is.
Edwards and Neftci (1988) looked at correlations among extreme
price moves across different futures contracts. Though FCMs may take
them into account in demanding margin from their customers, exchange
minimums currently ignore the correlations among prices. Extreme
price moves are more closely correlated for financial futures.
Figlewski (1984) studied the adequacy of initial and maintenance
minimum margins on stock index futures as performance guarantees: he
found that futures margins appear adequate if their only purpose is to
protect from default.
Gay, Hunter, and Kolb (1986) studied the level of minimum margins
set by exchanges for a wider variety of contracts. Within an
exchange, an individual trader who puts up the minimum margin should
have an equal probability of default in each contract. For some
contracts, this does not seem to be the case. However, the
probability appears to be more or less the same over time, and almost
all of the revisions in exchange minimums appear to be in the
predicted direction.
In a simulation designed to capture the interactions between
position limits and margin requirements, Pltska and Shalen (1989)
examine the effect of extremely high margins and extremely tight
position limits on trading activity in futures. They find that very
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high margin requirements lower open interest and volume, with at best
a neutral effect on price stability.
THE ADEQUACY OF CLEARING MARGINS:
When Volume Investors defaulted in 1985, it became clear that
customers should care about the financial health of their FCM.
Clearinghouses are legally bound to guarantee payment only from FCM to
FCM. Uhen some of its large customers defaulted, the Coraex
clearinghouse seized the margin of other Volume Investors customers as
payment. Most early studies had assumed that the clearinghouse would
guarantee payment to individual customers in such circumstances. In
fact, as Edwards (1983) points out, if they do not do so, the customer
has as incentive to monitor the creditworthiness of FCMs . One
regulatory response was the proposal by the CFTC of
"concentration-based" capital requirements, which are contingent on
the diversification of the FCM's position.
Under current conditions, customers may have an incentive to
choose FCMs with undiversified positions. If a customer wants to take
a short position in gold, for instance, it can avoid this particular
type of default risk by choosing an FCM whose other customers are also
short in gold. However, the risk aversion of FCMs drives them away
from such undiversified positions (Jordan and Morgan, 1989).
A related question deals with the risk of the clearinghouse
itself defaulting. Clearing association default risk depends on
several variables: the level of margins required of FCMs by clearing
members; whether they use a gross or net margin system; capital
requirements for clearing firms; the size of the guarantee fund. If a
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clearing association defaults, the non- defaulting investor's next
recourse is to demand performance from his FCM. (Edwards, 1983). One
source of regulatory concern is that a default by a major clearing
corporation could result in danger to the financial system as a whole
through bank and clearing firm failures.
The clearinghouse systems typical to the United States are not
the only possible means of organization. The London Metal Exchange,
largely a dealer market, had a vastly different system. For instance,
initial clearing margins were not mandatory among members. Members
used credit lines as margin accounts (Riess, 1986). Though this
exchange had successfully operated on this basis for many years, the
1986 crisis in the tin market prompted substantial changes in its
methods of operation.
Kolb (1986), in noting that most of the studies of the adequacy
of margins looked at fairly normal market conditions, raised the
question of whether margins are adequate for extraordinary events. In
October, 1987, his question was empirically tested. As Miller (1988)
points out, the futures margin system worked well as a guarantee even
during the October 1987 Crash: no FCM or clearing firms defaulted.
b) EXTERNALITIES AT THE EXCHANGE LEVEL:
Most economists would concede that futures margins work
relatively well as performance guarantees. Calls to regulate futures
margins cite significant externalities at the exchange level. Some
cite externalities which operate through interactions with stock and
options markets; they are covered below. Others contend that futures
trading has important externalities in itself.
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Cagan (1981) summarizes the most commonly cited externalities.
These include the absorption of credit by speculators, covered above;
the protection of inexperienced traders; the adverse affects of
corners and squeezes; alleged price volatility due to the existence of
futures; and the benefits of price discovery.
Fischel and Grossman (1984) argue that the protection of
inexperienced traders is less likely to be a serious problem in
futures markets than is commonly believed. First, because their
information increases the efficiency of the market, informed traders
help protect the uninformed. Second, futures participants are likely
to be relatively wealthy and sophisticated, and so need less
protection than the average investor. Most importantly, however, the
exchanges are in the business of selling futures trading, and thus
have the incentive to produce a high quality product.
Some writers advocate the regulation of futures margins based on
the contention that futures trading increases the volatility of the
underlying cash market. This increase in volatility is frequently
blamed on the phenomenon of "excess speculation."
In recent study of the introduction of trading in S&P 500 index
futures, Harris (1989) found that the introduction of the futures
contract was associated with an increase in the volatility of the
underlying stocks in the cash market. By contrast, Edwards (1988)
found that the introduction of the S&P500 futures contract coincided
with a period of lower stock price variability.
In a similar study. Skinner (1989) examined the impact of the
introduction of exchange -traded options on the variance of the
underlying stock. He concluded that the variance declines after the
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introduction of options, while volume increases.
The question of whether futures trading increases volatility is
difficult to settle empirically. Futures trading seems to be
successful only where there is substantial price volatility;
established futures markets, such as the market for cotton, have
declined dramatically in both volume and open interest when prices are
stabilized. Though futures trading volume and price variability seem
to be positively correlated (see, for example, Telser and Higinbotham,
1977), the argument is usually made that the causality runs from the
volatility to the futures trading, not vice versa, and that ceteris
paribus futures trading reduces variability (Telser, 1981; see also
numerous studies on the price effects of commodity futures trading
summarized in Tomek, 1981).
Further, any consideration of the benefits of regulation should
also consider its costs. This may include not only administrative
costs, but also the delay or stickiness often associated with federal
rulemaking (see below)
.
c) ARE FUTURES MARGINS AN EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT ON TRADERS?
Most authors assumed that an increase in margins increases the
cost of holding a position, so it should decrease speculation in both
stocks and futures (see, for example, Telser and Yamey, 1965).
Anderson (1981) argued that margins are not an effective
constraint. First, Anderson argued that they are not costly, since a
trader can post T-Bills as margin in most circumstances. If a trader
holds more bills in his portfolio than he needs as margin, he's not
constrained by margin requirements. Second, in portfolio theory, a
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futures margin requirement increase will lower investors' wealth as
well as increasing the cost of a futures position, and the total of
the income and substitution effects might lead a trader to reduce
positions in all other markets and leave the futures unaffected.
Third, trading volume may not be affected because intraday trading
isn't constrained by margins.
By- contrast, Kahl, Rutz, and Sinquefield (1985) treat margins as
entailing a loss of interest, but having no direct effects on
portfolios
.
Rutz (1986) estimates that 80% of the $3 billion in margin which
is held by the Chicago Board of Trade Clearing Corp is held in US
government securities, and less than .2% is in cash. Note, however,
that these figures refer to margin holdings at the clearinghouse
level; it is not clear what mix is collected by the brokers.
Breeden (1985) points out that an increase in margin requirements
effects trading costs in a number of ways. An increase in margin
requirements decreases the probability of outright default or of delay
in contract fulfillment. This should lower the cost of trading
directly, and also lower brokerage fees by lowering the brokers' costs
of debt collection. However, an increase in margins also increases
trading costs by the opportunity cost of the margin funds (that is,
the highest borrowing or lowest riskless lending rate)
.
Further, an increase in margin requirements may also have an effect on
the bid-ask spread. If an increase in margin requirements
changes volume, the shift in volume can change the bid-ask spread.
Since volume can be shifted up or down by a margin requirement
increase, the bid-ask spread can either increase or decrease, but the
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effect should be large only in a thin market. This implies that
exchanges will keep margin requirements relatively low in thin markets
to encourage the contract's survival, all else equal.
Edwards (1988) claims that the large increase in margins during
the silver crisis, intended to bring the long speculators under
control, forced many short traders to close out their positions
without driving out the targeted longs. If margins are indeed a
constraint, it is not clear who will be driven out, and so it is not
clear what the effect on the level or volatility of prices will be.
Further, since futures trading is no longer confined to the U.S.,
traders who are constrained by margin requirements on U.S. exchanges
may just shift to a competing exchange in another country. This could
make margin requirements totally ineffective.
Kolb, Gay, and Hunter (1984) estimate the cost of margins to
hedgers . They estimate the amount of funds necessary to avoid
depletion if prices follow a zero-drift Wiener process for the T-Bond,
GNMA, corn, soybean, and silver contracts, and for some
intra-commodity spreads. The amount of funds necessary depends on the
length of the hedging period and the variability of the futures price.
Though the focus of the paper is not on the adequacy of exchange
margin requirements, they conclude that the differences in margin
requirements do not fully reflect the differences in cash requirements
across different commodities, or between a simple long or short
position and a spread.
Kuhn (1981) looks at the settlemnt period times the price change
limit as an upper bound on the necessary margin; she concludes that
this results in excessively high margins. She also estimates the
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largest price change Likely in the collection period for various risk
levels, ignoring non-normalities and price limits. She compared these
with actual margin levels over the period 1964-1974. For a
5-day collection period, the risk of depletion was relatively low for
the grains: it never exceeded 8% for corn, 7% for wheat, 10% for
soybeans. For cattle, its maximum was 28%. During 1972-74, the risk
was much higher than during the earlier part of the period; limit
moves were rare, except during 1973-4.
d) EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENTS OF THE EFFECTS OF MARGINS CHANGES:
Empirical measurement of the relationship of margins to
volatility is not easy. As Telser and Yamey (1965) note, both the
broker's competitive margin and the exchange minimum should increase
in high volatility times. Since high volatility increases margins,
and margins affect volatility in turn, the question is hard to study
empirically.
Effects on trading volume may differ in the short and long run.
Volume is probably increased in the short run by a margin requirement
change, because some traders will adjust their positions. In the long
run, however, a margin requirement increase will probably decrease
volume, because a higher cost of trading decreases the demand for
futures contracts.
"*
• In their study of corn, wheat, and soybean markets from 1956 to
1966, Robert R. Nathan Associates (1967) found increases in
short- terra volatility following small to moderate margin increases.
Following large increases, they found decreases in volatility. They
also examined the interaction of the Working's T measure of
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speculation with price volatility, and concluded that inadequate
speculation often lead to the widest price fluctuations.
McCain (as cited in Kuhn, 1981) used an event study methodology
on wheat margin changes over the 1936 to 1968 period. After margin
increases, volume and open interest always dropped, but not
significantly. He could find no significant difference in Working's T
before or after margin changes.
Bear (1972) grouped futures markets by the level of minimum
margin. He looked at the differences in serial correlation of price
changes: positive serial correlation shows up at high margin levels
for the wheat and soybean markets. He interprets these results as
consistent with some margin levels being too high.
Hartzmark (1986) found that volume and open interest drop with
increases in margins, and that unpredictable changes occurred in the
composition of traders. He found no significant relationship with
volatility.
Fishe and Goldberg (1986) looked at the effects on open interest
and volume of changes in initial margins for all Chicago Board of
Trade contracts over the period 1972 to 1987. They found margin
changes had a small, significant effect on open interest in nearby
contracts, but no significant effect on more distant futures. Results
on volume were inconclusive.
Breeden (1985) found that margins predict future volatility
better than ARIMA models, especially in volatile markets. He puts
forward one possible interpretation: these results may reflect the
ability of exchange margin committees to anticipate changes in market
conditions. The TIMS system mentioned above uses the implied
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volatility derived from options prices to help set margins.
5) INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MARGINS ON DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS:
Much of the regulatory concern directed at futures margins stems
from concern over possible interactions between the stock, futures,
and options markets (FRBG, 1984). »
a) "LEVEL PLAYING FIELD" ARGUMENTS
Investors and risk managers often have a choice of related
financial instruments. The decision as to whether to use, say,
futures or stocks to carry out a buying program will hinge on a number
of factors: tax considerations, the liquidity of the instrument,
commissions, and so on. One factor which may influence this decision
is the amount of margin required. Some argue that the relatively low
level of futures margins gives them an unfair competitive advantage
over related instruments.
There are two issues involved. First, there is the factual
question of the relative size of margins. Comparison of margin levels
between instruments is not always easy. Second, if margins are an
important cost of dealing in these instruments, and are unequal when
properly measured, what is the appropriate policy response?
MEASURING THE RELATIVE LEVEL OF MARGINS ACROSS INSTRUMENTS:
Figlewski (1984) compares initial and maintenance margins on
stocks, options on stocks, and stock index futures, where a direct
comparison can be made. He finds that, though futures margins appear
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adequate, stock margins as set by Regulation T are much too high if
their only purpose is to protect from default.
Ginter (1988) also compared the levels of maintenance margins for
stocks and stock index futures. He noted that the adequacy of
maintenance margins depends on the square root of clearing time and
the volatilities of the underlying instruments. First, since stocks
take seven days to clear while futures take only one, the margin on
stocks needs to be 2.65 times the margin on futures. Second, since
the volatility of the average stock is 1.85 times the volatility of
the futures index, stock margins on the average stock need to be 1.85
times the futures margin. Taking the two factors together, the
maintenance margin on the average stock needs to be 4.90 times the
margin for stock index futures. For some stocks, the 25% maintenance
margin required by the NYSE is actually low relative to the
maintenance margin for stock index futures; for some, it is high.
Phillips and Tosini (1982) compared margins for futures and
options positions. When they made their comparison, positions which
are good substitutes from a risk manager's perspective had widely
different margin requirements. They pointed out that margin rules did
not take into account modern techniques of risk management. For
instance, futures and options are both good risk management tools, but
a futures position usually (but not always) required less margin
deposit than the equivalent option position. Options margins were not
based on premium changes, so an options -based hedge resulted in margin
changes which did not reflect the change in value of the position.
The new margining systems in options and futures were designed to
resolve some of these inconsistencies.
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RESOLVING INCONSISTENT MARGIN LEVELS:
Figlewski (1984) points out that the relatively high margins he
measured for stocks puts the stock exchanges at a competitive
disadvantage. However, this does not mean that futures margins should
be raised. He points out that low margins on futures benefit
investors and stock issuers, though they hurt stock exchanges. He
proposes that stock margins be lowered instead. • '
Estrella (1988), in comparing the stock, options, index, and
futures markets, asks whether margins should be made consistent. If
so, how does one do this? One answer is to set the probability of
default for an individual position equal across markets. However,
from a regulatory standpoint, this is not the full answer, since
individual default and market default may have different relationships
in different markets.
•'>'
' Estrella points out that different margin rules should be set for
combined positions and for positions which include options, both of
which are technically difficult problems. If one regulatory objective
is to control speculation, consistency is important. But, the
relationship among speculation, margin requirements, and volatility is
not well understood. Further, he concludes that there may be conflict
between the regulatory goals of insuring the integrity of the markets
and preventing excess speculation.
Recent attempts to tackle the problem of combined positions which
involve options include the TIMS and CONMON systems operated by the
Options Clearing Corporation, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's DAR
(Dollars At Risk) system, and the Chicago Board of Trade Risk Based
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Margin System (RBM) . All are based on option pricing theory. They
predict the value of a portfolio of assets, which may include
different options or combinations of options and futures, under a set
range of possible stock prices and, sometimes , stock price
volatilities. The margin is set high enough to cover the liquidation
cost of the portfolio in the worst case outcome within that range.
The systems have not been in place long enough for a full assessment
of their fairness and adequacy to be made, but so far appear to be an
improvement over the previous ad hoc system.
b) MEASURES OF INTERACTION EFFECTS
Kupiec (1990) studies the interaction between futures margins on
the S6eF500 futures contract and stock price volatility from April,
1982 through September, 1988. The absolute level of the futures
margin changed only nine times during that period. However, since he
measures the futures margin as a percentage of contract value, his
measure of leverage changes daily. Using two different measures of
volatility, and correcting for seasonal and day-of-the-week effects,
he does not find that higher margins decrease volatility. Indeed,
according to his estimates, increases in margin requirements are
associated with volatility increases.
c) COORDINATION EASE:
The Brady report on the October 1987 Crash concluded that stocks,
stock options, and stock index futures should be regulated by the same
agency in order to ease coordination during a crisis (Edwards, 1988).
Rutz (1983) points out that the government has the incentive to
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set margins too high, to avoid administrative costs and complexity.
Excessively high margins would increase hedging costs, possibly
shifting trade overseas or into forward markets. He also contends
that governments cannot move fast enough. Brinkman (1981) also
emphasizes the superior ability of the exchanges to respond quickly in
a crisis.
Hartzmark (1986) states that the exchanges are concerned about
the Fed's knowledge of cash markets and about the frequency of margin
requirement changes. The Fed at one point suggested setting futures
margins in percentage terms, which would hamper the marking- to-market
system, and would imply daily changes in margins for FCMs . Further,
coordination between the FRB, the SEC, and the CFTC would be needed if
margins were to be set by the government. Alternatives would be to
give the SEC and CFTC oversight of exchange-set margins, or even limit
them to emergency powers over margins. A council of exchange members,
government personnel, etc. would have to be exempt from antitrust.
Setting margins by such a council would result in policy which
reflected the composition of membership rather than social welfare.
Some writers advocate giving the Fed control of margin
requirements on Treasury bill futures to avoid interference with
monetary policy. The argument hinges on whether the existence of
futures causes an Increase in the volatility of Treasury bill prices
(Cagan, 1981). However, as stated above, this argument is difficult
to settle empirically.
Conflict over jurisdiction between regulatory agencies may have
benefits. Increased competition between the agencies may result in
better policy. "Better policy" is hard to quantify, but most people
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would say that informed debate on the issues is likely to lead to
better policy. Much of the recent post-Crash debate on margin policy
was sparked by the jurisdictional competition between the CFTC, the
SEC and the Fed. Whatever the outcome of the debate, it has resulted
in an outpouring of excellent papers, which has greatly increased our
knowledge of the operation of these markets.
(53)
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APPENDIX: OPTIONS MARGINS
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange Margins Manual, October 1988.
This covers the most coimnon short positions in puts and calls held in
a margin account. Short option positions can also be held in a cash
account; the rules are given in the main text. As stated in the text,
long options premiums must be paid in full.
Required margins for a short call written on stock:
Initial: C_ + .20 S- - max(E-S 0) but not less than C- + .10 S_
Maintenance: C + . 20 S - max(E-S ,0) but not less than C + . 10 S
Required margins for a short call written on an index:
Initial: C + .15 I *$500 - maxCE-S^.O)
but not less than C^ + . 10 I-^ * $500
Maintenance: C + .15 I *$500 - max(E-S ,0)
but not less than C + . 10 I * $500
(In some cases, e.g. the MMI
,
$500 should be replaced by $250)
Required margins for a short put written on stock:
Initial: Pq + .20 S. - maxCS.-E.O) but not less than P- + .10 S-
Maintenance: P + .20 S - max(S -E,0) but not less than P + .10 S
Required margins for a short put written on an index:
Initial: P + .15 Iq*$500 - max(SQ-E,0)
but not less than Pq + . 10 Iq * $500
Maintenance: P + .15 I *$500 - max(S -E,0)
but not less than P + . 10 I * $500
(60)
(In some cases, e.g. the MMI
,
$500 should be replaced by $250)
where:
C^ is the price of the call at time t
S^ is the price of the stock at time t
E is the exercise price of the option
P^ is the price of the put at time t
and
I^ is the value of the index at time t



The person charging this material is responsible for
Its return to the library from which it was withdrawn
on or before the Latest Date stamped below
Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for discipli-nary action and may result in dismissal from the University
To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
JUN
m'
I L16I—O-1096





I
HECKMAN |±J
BINDERY INC. |g|
JUN95
Bound
-To
-Plcas^ N.MANCHESTER

